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WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
actively engaged, and the lack of any other obstacle to enforcing
payment. Further, the statement by the payee that "Not one dollar
of this debt has ever been paid" was insufficient to rebut, even
though he was a competent witness. The court indicated that the
presumption would be rebutted by proof of payment of interest
during the twenty year period, continued absence from the country
by the obligee, continued insolvency of the obligor, or other strong
circumstances showing nonpayment or good cause for longer fore-
bearance. Supra at 403-04. The presumption may be rebutted by
payment of part of the principal of the debt, Camden v. Alkire,
supra, or by acknowledgement by the debtor, Payne v. Dudley,
supra. None of the above seemed to be present in the principal case.
However, the court apparently placed emphasis on the fact that the
obligees and the widow of the obligor were related, and that the
plaintiffs did not wish to create a hardship on her by forcing a sale
of her home. This circumstance was held to excuse the delay in
enforcing the debt, thereby precluding the defense of laches, but in
view of the strength of the presumption as stated in the Criss case,
supra, it is questionable whether this factor alone should be a suffi-
cient rebuttal. Evidently, when the above relationship was consid-
ered in conjunction with the possession of the note by the obligees,
it was enough to rebut the presumption.
The case stands as a warning to the title examiner who finds an
unreleased deed of trust, when the obligation it secures became
due prior to 1921. The abstractor must evaluate the strength of
the presumption as applied to the facts of the particular case and
advise accordingly. An unreleased encumbrance is excepted from
the provisions of a title insurance policy, and the insured is not
protected against its enforcement. GAGE, LAND TrrLE AssURING
AGENCIES 91 (1937). Therefore, it is important to determine what
weight the court is going to give to the presumption of payment,
if and when the question again arises.
C. M. C.
EvmENcE - PIvILEGE AGAINST SxiF-INCIUMIATION - CONSTrTU-
TioNi xtA OF IMMuNry STATuE.-D was adjudged guilty of con-
tempt of court for refusing to testify before a grand jury investi-
gating matters concerned with attempts to endanger the national
security. D had been ordered by a federal district court, under
the authority granted by the Immunity Act of 1954, to testify with
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respect to such matters as were under inquiry by the grand jury.
The immunity statute provided: "[I]n any case or proceeding be-
fore any grand jury . . . involving any interference with or en-
dangering of . . . the national security or defense of the United
States by treason, sabotage, espionage ... upon order of the court
such witness shall not be excused from testifying... on the ground
that the testimony... may tend to incriminate him or subject him
to a penalty or forfeiture. But no such witness shall be prose-
cuted . . . for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing
concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his privi-
lege against self-incrimination... ." 68 STAT. 745 (1954), 18 U.S.C.
§ 3486 (c) (Supp. II, 1955). D contended that the statute was
unconstitutional as being in violation of the privilege against self-
incrimination for the reason that it did not grant immunity from
prosecution under state law. Held, that the immunity statute was
constitutional and therefore, the defendant could be so compelled
to testify. UlUman v. United States, 24 U.S.L. WEEK 4147 (U.S.
Mar. 26, 1956).
The court, in the instant case, held the statute constitutional
on the authority of Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). In the
Brown case, the statute provided: "That no person shall be ex-
cused from attending and testifying . . . in any cause or proceed-
ing . . . based upon or growing out of any alleged violation of
the act of Congress, entitled, 'An act to regulate commerce,' . . .
on the ground or for the reason that the testimony . . . may tend
to criminate him .... But no person shall be prosecuted . . . for
or on account of any transaction, matter or thing, concerning which
he may testify .... " 27 STAT. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1952).
Brown was subpoenaed to testify before a grand jury which was
investigating alleged violations of the Interstate Commerce Act.
Invoking the privilege against self-incrimination, he refused to
answer certain questions. The court adjudged him guilty of con-
tempt. The holding in the Brown case is summarized by the court
in the principal case as follows: "[A] statute which compelled
testimony but secured the witness against a criminal prosecution
which might be aided directly or indirectly by his disclosures did
not violate the fifth amendments privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and that the 1893 statute did provide such immunity." Ullman
v. United States, supra at 4149.
It appears that all the Supreme Court is doing in deciding the
principal case is reaffirming the proposition that Congress has the
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authority to deny a witness the privilege against self-incrimination
and thereby, can compel him to testify where the statute grants
complete immunity to the witness from prosecution concerning
such matters.
R. W. F.
PRoPERTY-Jonrr TENANCY-EFFECr OF MURDER ON THE RIGHT
OF Sunvrvoaskrm.-H and W, husband and wife, owned property in
joint tenancy. H murdered W, was convicted, and was sentenced to
the penitentiary. W's heir-at-law sued to recover the property from
H, contending that H held the property on a constructive trust for
W's heir. Held, that a joint tenant who murders his cotenant de-
stroys all rights of survivorship and retains only the title to his
undivided one-half interest in the property as a tenant in common
with the heir-at-law of the decedent. Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill.2d 106,
129 N.E.2d 699 (1955). In so holding, the court overruled its earlier
decision in Welsh v. James, 408 Ill. 18, 95 N.E.2d 872 (1950).
It is a maxim of equity that "No person will be permitted to
benefit from his wrong." This, however, comes into conflict with
the right of inheritance (1) when an heir murders an ancestor,
(2) when a legatee or devisee murders the testator, (8) when a
beneficiary of a life insurance policy murders the insured, and
(4) when a joint tenant murders his cotenant. [Tenancies by the
entirety are generally treated the same as joint tenancies. For a
collection of cases, see Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 1102 (1958).]
Different courts have reached different results in determining
this conflict. In the first three situations the courts allow the mur-
derer to take the inheritance but require him to hold it on a con-
structive trust so that he will not benefit from his wrong. RESTATE-
iENT, RESTITUTIoN, §§ 187, 189 (1937). But in dealing with a
joint tenancy, the courts have divided at least five different ways.
This diversity is caused by the legal fiction that a joint tenant holds
the entire estate from the time of the original investiture, which
factor is not present in the other situations.
In Neiman v. Hurff, 11 N.J. 55, 93 A.2d 345 (1952), where the
husband murdered his wife with whom he held stocks as a joint
tenant, the court held that the husband would take all the shares
of stock, but would hold them in trust for a legatee under his wife's
will, subject to a lien for the commuted value of his interest in the
stocks which would be a life estate in one-half of the net income.
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